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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1987).
In 1985, the Public Service Commission of Utah (the "Commission") initiated a generic proceeding involving all providers of
local exchange telephone service in Utah. The purpose of the proceeding was to consider the development of a "Lifeline telephone
service" program for qualified low income households.

After

evidentiary hearings, the proceeding ultimately resulted in the
adoption of Lifeline Rules (R. 630-635; Addendum 2, Exhibit A)
and companion Orders of the Commission dated December 17, 1986
(R. 636-51; Addendum 2, Exhibits B and C) implementing the Rules
and the Lifeline program effective January 1, 1987. Among numerous other things, the Rules and Orders provide that the reduced
rates applicable to Lifeline customers are to be funded by a surcharge on each access line of participating companies as well as
a surcharge in long distance rates. The revenues derived from the
surcharges are pooled by all participating companies. This appeal
relates to the requirement of pooling under the Rules and Orders.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the Commission lack the statutory authority to re-

quire a Lifeline pooling mechanism, the effect of which is to
require non-Lifeline customers of Mountain Bell to subsidize in
part the Lifeline customers of other telephone companies?
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2.

Was the action of the Commission to require a Lifeline

pooling arrangement an appropriate exercise of its ratemaking
power?
3.

Is the pooling arrangement an illegal tax imposed by a

regulatory agency that lacks the power to tax?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann, § 54-4-12 (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a petition for review of the Lifeline Rules and
Orders of the Commission issued in Case No. 85-999-13.

In this

case, the Commission adopted Rules and issued Orders requiring
local exchange carriers who provide Lifeline service to pool
revenues and costs associated with the provision of Lifeline
service.

In this petition for review, Mountain Bell asks the

Court to set aside those portions of the Lifeline Rules and
Orders requiring the pooling arrangement.
B.

Course of Proceedings Before the Commission.

On June 20, 1985, the Commission initiated this case as a
generic proceeding to address numerous issues relating to the
establishment, administration and funding of a discounted local
exchange service (commonly known as "Lifeline" service) for low
income telephone subscribers (R. 337-38). The Commission raised
nineteen issues it desired the parties to address, including
whether the Commission has the power to establish Lifeline ser-
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vice, how the revenue shortfall should be met, and whether surcharge revenues should be pooled (R. 349-51). After several parties, including Mountain Bell, filed Briefs supporting the Commission's ability to order a Lifeline service (R. 359-91), the
Commission issued a Declaratory Order on January 3, 1986 concluding that "it has the authority to establish a lower rate to provide 'lifeline' service to a distinct group of ratepayers." (R.
472) .
Hearings were held in February 1986 dealing with a variety of
issues, such as who should receive Lifeline service, how they
would be qualified, how the lower rates would be funded, what
services would be discounted, etc.

After issuing two versions of

proposed Rules (R. 515-19, 555-60) and receiving comments from
the parties (R. 520-47, 567-76, 585-95), the Commission adopted
Lifeline Rules on December 1, 1986 (R. 630-35).
attached as Exhibit A to Addendum II.

The Rules are

On December 17, 1986, the

Commission issued two companion Orders in Case No. 85-999-13.
The first Order (attached hereto as Exhibit B to Addendum II)
established procedures for implementing the Lifeline program,
established the surcharges, and ordered local exchange carriers
to file Lifeline tariffs (R. 636-42).

In the second Order

(attached hereto as Exhibit C to Addendum II) the Commission made
findings of fact as to its rationale for adopting a Lifeline program, affirmed the effectiveness of the Lifeline Rules and
ordered the program to become effective on January 1, 1987 (R.
643-51).

On December 22, 1986 Mountain Bell filed an Application
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for Review or Rehearing of those portions of the Rules requiring
a pooling arrangement (R. 659-62).

The Commission denied the

application on January 12, 1987 (R. 673-75; Addendum II, Exhibit
D).

On January 6, 1987 Mountain Bell filed an Application for

Review and Rehearing of the companion Orders of December 17, 1986
(R. 664-66).

The Commission denied the application on February

4, 1987 (R. 684-87; Addendum II, Exhibit E ) . The Petition for
Review was filed on February 11, 1987 (R. 694).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Lifeline Program.

An understanding of Mountain

Bell's appeal requires a general explanation of the Lifeline program adopted by the Commission.
Paragraph 1(1) of the Lifeline Rules requires any local exchange carrier whose basic local exchange rates exceed $9.45 per
month to establish Lifeline telephone service (R.630).

The Rules

define as an eligible party to receive Lifeline service any person who is currently eligible for any one of eight state assistance programs (_Id*)# and defines how such persons shall apply
for the program (R. 631). line Rules set forth procedures for
verifying eligibility (R. 631-32).

Section IV of the Rules

states that Lifeline customers shall pay $9.45 for basic telephone service (R. 632). Thus, the Lifeline discount for local
exchange service is the difference between $9.45 and the basic
rate for service (which in Mountain Bell's case is $13.13, for a
discount of $3.78 per month).

Once a state commission approves a

Lifeline rate, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) waives
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an FCC charge of $2.00 per month (R. 682-83).

Thus, the total

Lifeline discount for Mountain Bell Lifeline customers is $5.78
per month.

Lifeline service is thus discounted local exchange

service available for qualified low income subscribers.

Lifeline

customers also receive a 50 percent discount on the connection
fees applicable to connecting local exchange service.

Mountain

Bell does not object to any of the foregoing provisions of the
Rule.

Indeed, Mountain Bell supports them as being completely

reasonable.
B.

Lifeline Funding.

The sole reason for Mountain Bell's

appeal is its objection to the mechanism used to fund Lifeline
service.

Section VI of the Rule provides that 80 percent of the

cost of funding Lifeline service is to come from a surcharge on
the local exchange service^ of non-Lifeline customers of companies offering Lifeline service.

The additional 20 percent is to

be funded by a surcharge on "all intrastate toll and access
services in the State of Utah."2

Section VI(3) creates a pool

into which the revenues from the surcharges flow.
is designated to be the pool administrator.

The Commission

One of its duties is

to distribute "to each local exchange carrier offering lifeline
telephone service a share of such pool so as to equalize state-

1.

This charge applies to all basic residence and business
lines. For example, the typical residence customer who has
only one line pays one surcharge per month. Customers with
more than one line pay a surcharge on each line.

2.

This surcharge is assessed on a per minute of use basis on
long distance calls billed by local carriers and on intrastate access services used by alternate toll providers.

-

q

-

wide the amount of the local service surcharge paid by customers
of such carriers to fund lifeline telephone service."
(§ VI.(3)(c), R. 634; emphasis added).

Thus, the local surcharge

is not calculated on a company by company basis; rather, the surcharge is calculated as though the companies supplying Lifeline
service were one company rather than several different entities.
It is this pooling arrangement to which Mountain Bell objects.
C.

The Effect of Pooling.

The effect of pooling was clear-

ly described during the hearings.

The second largest local ex-

change company in Utah is Continental Telephone Company (Contel).
The evidence showed that Mountain Bell has approxxmately 468,000
residence lines while Contel has about 10,000 (R.62).

It was

estimated that there were 37,610 potential Lifeline customers in
Mountain Bell, or approximately 8 percent of its total customers
(R. 62-63, 199). For Contel, however, the estimated potential
Lifeline customers were 2028 or approximately 20 percent of the
total (R. 62-63, 199). On that basis, Contel's witness, Mr.
Theodore Carrier, took the position that Lifeline should be funded on a pooled basis and not on a company specific basis since,
in his view, Lifeline is a '"social program for the benefit of
society." (R. 183). Mr. Carrier acknowledged that under a pooling arrangement Mountain Bell's non-Lifeline customers would be
paying more in Lifeline surcharges than they would if they were
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funding only Mountain Bell's lifeline customers.3

The obvious

effect of pooling is that non-Lifeline customers of companies
like Mountain Bell must pay higher surcharges and that non-

3.

The following interchange occurred between counsel for
Mountain Bell and Mr. Carrier:
Q.

Let's discuss pooling for just a minute. Based on the
revised numbers that you gave us in your summary you
are asserting at this point that based on the numbers
available to you that — and based on some of the Division' s numbers at approximately 20% of Continental's
residential customers would qualify for lifeline and
8.4% of Mountain Bell's would qualify.

A.

Correct.

Q.

Would you agree — maybe I can phrase this hypothetically. Would you agree that if indeed those numbers are
correct, and also assume that the amount of any lifeline discount that would be applied in Continental versus Mountain Bell would be roughly the same, that in
that kind of an instance that Mountain Bell ratepayers
would be paying more under a pooling arrangement than
they would if they were merely being asked to fund lifeline within Mountain Bell?

A.

Oh, no doubt about it; however, ConTel customers would
be paying substantially greater than Mountain Bell nonlifeline customers to fund a social service program.

Q.

In other words, you're saying that if we kept them separate ConTel would be paying more than Mountain Bell?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

I think I understand your argument. I just wanted to
make sure the record is clear that under the proposal
that you're making and with the numbers that you have
given here that your proposal would cause Mountain Bell
customers to pay more than they otherwise would if they
were merely supporting lifeline for other Mountain Bell
customers.
A.

That's correct. (R. 199-20).
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(Emphasis added).

Lifeline customers in companies like Contel pay less.

Thus, Con-

tel Lifeline customers are subsidized in part by customers of a
completely different company•
Dc

Mountain Bell Objected Repeatedly to Pooling.

During

the evidentiary hearings and at later points in the proceeding
Mountain Bell objected to a pooling arrangement.
Mr. Orville Unruh, Mountain Bell's witness, testified that
Mountain Bell opposed pooling and indicated that it was improper
to move the burden of Lifeline funding from one company's customers ' to another company's customers (R. 150, 164-65).

He in-

dicated that welfare type programs are "beyond the capability of
private corporations." (R. 166). He also pointed out he did not
believe "one company can afford to subsidize another company as
we move into a competitive environment." (R. 168)•
Later, in response to proposed rules that required pooling,
Mountain Bell filed comments claiming that pooling was both inappropriate and beyond the power of the Commission (R. 529-33;
589-90).
In its orders denying rehearing, the Commission implied that
the stipulation entered by Mountain Bell and other parties which
established working procedures for the Lifeline program was somehow an agreement "that all parties to the Stipulation were in
agreement that pooling was the only presently workable mechanism
to fund the Lifeline program." (R. 674, 685). Mountain Bell's
entry into the Stipulation was not in any manner a concession
that pooling was either approporiate or legal. At the time of the
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Stipulation, the Commission had made it clear that it intended to
adopt Rules requiring pooling and that it wanted the Lifeline
program to begin on January 1, 1987. Given those facts, the Stipulation was an attempt on Mountain Bell's part to cooperate with
the Commission and other parties to develop workable procedures.
It was not a waiver of the position Mountain Bell had taken with
regard to pooling.

In fact, Mountain Bell refused to enter the

Stipulation until the insertion of paragraph 9, which states:
9. This Stipulation reflects agreement by all parties as to
the procedures to administer the lifeline telephone service
program as well as the initial lifeline telephone service
surcharge rates. It does not in any way limit the right of
any party to exercise all legal rights available to them,
including the right to seek rehearing or review of the Commission' s Rule or the Order ultimately adopted by the Commission or to appeal such Rule or Order if they so choose.
(R. 622). Thus, while Mountain Bell agreed to procedures to make
a pooling procedure operate efficiently, it did not waive its
right to seek review or appeal of the Rules or Orders.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The Lifeline pooling arrangement was beyond the statu-

tory power of the Commission.

The Commission's power must come

from statutes that expressly grant the power or which clearly
imply the existence of the power.

Neither Section 54-4-5 and 54-

4-7 (the provisions cited by the Commission) nor any other statutory provision grants such a power to the Commission.

The fact

that the legislature expressly granted the Commission the power
to require pooling in another context but was silent with regard
to such a power in the Lifeline context demonstrates the lack of
authority in this context.

Under the principle of construction
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"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another), the Commission lacks the
power to require pooling•
2.

The Commission possesses the power to implement a Life-

line program under its ratemaking power.

However, that ratemak-

ing power does not extend to allowing the Commission to order the
customers of one company to pay rates that subsidize the rates of
customers in a separate company.
3.

The Commission does not have the power to tax.

In

requiring the customers of one company to pay rates that, in
part, subsidize discounted local exchange service for customers
in other companies, the Commission has illegally imposed a tax.
ARGUMENT
I. BECAUSE THE BASIC ISSUE IN THIS APPEAL IS WHETHER THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN REQUIRING A POOLING ARRANGEMENT, THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW ACCORDS NO DEFERENCE TO
THE COMMISSION.
The correct scope of judicial review of Commission orders was
comprehensively explained in Utah Department of Administrative
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)
("Wexpro II").

In this appeal, the basic issue is whether the

Commission went beyond its statutory authority in ordering a
pooling arrangement.

The Wexpro II decision defined the standard

of review in such a case as follows:
In reviewing the Commission's interpretations of general
questions of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error
standard, with no deference to the expertise of the Commission.
Examples of this correction-of-error type of review include
whether the Commission has complied with fairness requirements of due process, whether the Commission has acted beyond
- 10 -

its statutory jurisdiction or authority, and such questions
of general law as the interpretation of contracts and certificates. (Footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
Id. at 608.

Thus, since the question in the appeal is whether

the Commission acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction or authority, the correction of error standard applies.
II. THE COMMISSION LACKS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE A
"POOLING" ARRANGEMENT AS PART OF THE LIFELINE FUNDING MECHANISM.
The central legal issue in this appeal is whether the Commission has the legal authority to mandate a pooling arrangement as
the means to fund Lifeline telephone service.

A careful analysis

of the law makes it clear that the Commission does not possess
that power.
A. Although Vested With Broad Power to Regulate Public Utilities, the Commission's Power Must Derive from Specific Statutes.
A line of recent Utah Supreme Court cases establishes clearly
that the jurisdiction over utilities granted in Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-4-1^ is not so broad as to empower the Commission to do anything it believes is in the public interest.

In Interwest Corp.

v. Public Service Commission, 510 P.2d 919 (Utah 1973), a regulated water company refused to supply a new customer in its
service area with all of the water requested because, although it

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (1986):
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction
to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state,
and to supervise all of the business of every such public
utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein
specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are
necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction. . . .
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currently had sufficient supplies to do so, it had previously
committed some of its excess to a prior user's planned future
requirements.

Attempting to protect the public interest, the

Commission ordered that the utility need not supply all of the
needs of the new customer because numerous members of the public
had acted in reliance on the plans of the prior customer to have
water available for them when they needed it.

The Court reversed

the Commission, holding:
The Public Service Commission was created by the legislature
and charged with the gen€»ral duties of regulating public
utilities. The Commission can only exercise those powers
granted by the legislature"! We find no statute, nor has our
attention been called to any statute, which authorizes the
Commission to set up a system of priorities or allocations"
for the use of water on aTerritorial basis as> was done in
this case.
510 P.2d at 920 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Commission may not

adopt any power it deems useful in the public interest, but is
limited to those powers granted by the Legislature.
In Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission, 5 31
P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975), the Court reaffirmed the principle that
the Commission's power of regulation is a delegation of legislative authority and that "restraints or duties imposed by law must
be clear and unequivocal."

Id. at 1305.

The Court also stated:

In harmony with this it is well established that a regulatory
body such as the Public Service Commission, which is created
by ?ri derives its powers and duties from statute, has no
inherent regulatory powers, but only those which are expressly granted, or which are clearly implied as necessary to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it.
Id. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added).
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In Kearns-Tribune Corp* v. Public Service Commission, 682
P.2d 858 (Utah 1984), the Commission, relying on Section 54-4-1
as authority, required Mountain Fuel to include a tagline^ on
certain of its advertising.

The Supreme Court expressly rejected

such a broad reading of Section 54-4-1:
In a ruling on a similar tagline requirement, the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that the tagline requirement was not
within the authority delegated to the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon. This holding was grounded on the absence
of a "clearly defined statutory grant of authority" for the
enactment of the tagline rule. The relevant Oregon statutes
included broad language similar to Utah's § 54-4-1, on which
the PSC relies in this case. . . .
Despite the broad language of the Oregon statute, and further
expansive language giving the Commissioner the authority to
"adopt and amend reasonable and proper rules and regulations
relative to all statutes administered by him," the Oregon
court was unable to find a clearly defined statutory grant of
authority authorizing the imposition of a tagline because the
statutory scheme nowhere mentioned the authority to regulate
advertising as a discrete function. We are similarly unable
to find any clearly defined statutory grant to the PSC to
regulate utility advertising.
Id. at 859-60 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).

The

Court also noted that "the PSC has no broad statutory authority
to 'serve the public interest,'" but is limited to practices
"'necessary and convenient' in the exercise of [its] regulation
of rates."

^Ici. at 861 n. 1.

Kearns-Tribune clearly shows that

Section 54-4-1 does not invest the Commission with unbridled
discretion.

5.

Tagline, as used in Kearns-Tribune, refers to a statement
required to be included with certain advertisements indicating that the cost of the advertisement would not be claimed
as an operating expense in ratemaking.
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Even in the context of ratemaking, an area of regulation in
which the Commission clearly has significant power, the Court has
held that Section 54-4-1 does not mean the Commission can do anything it chooses.

For example, in Utah Department of Business

Regulation v. Public Service Co, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986), the
Commission relied on Section 54-4-1 for authority to authorize
Utah Power & Light to make an accounting adjustment by transferring funds from an "energy balancing account" to a general
revenue account to make up for revenue shortfalls in the general
revenue account.

The Court held that the Commission had exceeded

its statutory authority.

Id. at 423.

B.
No Specific Statute Gives the Commission the Power to
Require Pooling of the Funding of Lifeline Service.
In its orders denying rehearing, the Commission claimed that
the authority to require a mandatory pooling arrangement exists
under Sections 54-4-5 and 54-4-7 of Utah Code Annotated (R. 674,
685-86).

Neither of these statutes grant such a power to the

Commission.
The applicable portion of section 54-4-5 states:
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing, that the
rates, fares or charges in force over the lines of two or
more common carriers between any two points in this state are
unjust, unreasonable or excessive, or that no satisfactory
through route or joint rate fare or charge exists between
such points, or that public convenience and necessity demand
the establishment of a through route and joint rate, fare or
charge between such points, the commission shall order such
common carriers to establish such through route, and may
establish and fix a joint rate, fare or charge which will be
fair, just, reasonable and sufficient to be allowed, charged,
enforced, demanded and collected in the future, and the terms
and conditions under which such through route shall be operated. (Emphasis added).
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In its orders denying rehearing, the Commission focused on the
term "joint rate11 and concluded without further analysis that
such language gave it the authority to require a pooling arrangement.

In so doing, the Commission ignored the language limiting

the application of Section 54-4-5 to "common carriers" and failed
to recognize that the telephone utilities are not "common carriers" under Utah law.

Section 54-2-1(8) defines common carriers

as follows:
(8)

"Common carrier" includes every:
(a)

railroad corporation;

(b)

street railroad corporation;

(c)

automobile corporation;

(d)

scheduled aircraft carrier corporation;

(e)

aerial bucket tramway corporation;

(f)

express corporation;

(g) dispatch, sleeping, dining, drawing-room, freight,
refrigerator, oil, stock, and fruit car corporation;
(h) freight line, car-loaning, car-renting,
car-loading, and every other car corporation, and person;
(i) their lessees, trustees, and receivers, operating
for public service within this state; and
(j) every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, engaged in the transportation of
persons or property for public service over regular routes
between points within this state.
Obviously, since Section 54-4-5 applies only to common carriers,
and since neither Mountain Bell nor any other telephone utility
subject to the Lifeline Rule falls within that definition, the
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Commission's reliance upon Section 54-4-5 is totally misplaced.6
The Commission's reliance on Section 54-4-7 is equally misplaced.

That section states:

Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that the
rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public utility, or the methods of
manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or supply
employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unscife, improper,
inadequate or insufficient, the Commission shall determine
the just, reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient
rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, constructed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its
order, rule or regulation. The commission, after a hearing,
shall prescribe rules and regulations for the performance of
any service or the furnishing of any commodity of the character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on proper demand and tender of rates such public utility shall furnish such commodity or render such service within the time
and upon the conditions provided in such rules.
(Emphasis added). The Commission quoted the underlined portions
in support of its conclusion that it possessed the power to require pooling.

Apparently the Commission has concluded that the

general language empowering it to order utilities to

Even if telephone utilities fell under Section 54-4-5, it
does not give the Commission the authority to require pooling. When the statute uses the terms "joint rate" it is
referring to rates applicable when "two or more common carriers" are "jointly" providing a service. A pooling arrangement and a joint rate are not synonymous. Rather, a joint
rate and the authority to apportion a joint rate between two
separate utilities deals with the situation where multiple
companies are providing a singular service. By contrast,
Lifeline service is not a joint service of multiple providers . It is nothing more than a discounted local exchange
service for certain qualified low income households.
Mountain Bell provides Lifeline service solely to its own
customers. In the telephone industry it is the furthest
thing from a jointly provided service.
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"render . . . service within the time and upon the conditions
provided in such rules'1 is sufficient to allow it to order a
pooling arrangement by which the customers of one company subsidize the customers of an entirely different company.

Such a con-

clusion is unwarranted•
The statute is a general provision giving the Commission the
power to assure that such things as a utility's equipment and
facilities are appropriate or that its methods of manufacture or
supply are proper.

It is obviously referring to the physical

activities of providing a utility service or commodity, such as
having regulatory oversight over unsafe facilities or equipment.
Indeed, the only case that has construed this section dealt with
whether the loading facilities of a railroad were safe.

Union

Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Commission, 211 P.2d 851 (Utah
1949) .
Also, the statute refers to public utility in the singular.
Nothing in its language purports to allow the Commission, as it
has done in the Lifeline Rules, to require one utility's customers to fund the services of the customers of another utility.
It takes a massive leap of logic to construe the vague and
obviously inapplicable language of Section 54-4-7 to support a
pooling mechanism.

Section 54-4-7 manifestly grants no explicit

authority to support the Commission's action.

There is nothing

in the context of the provision that could implicitly grant such
power to the Commission.

It thus fails the tests of Interwest,

Basin Flying Service, and Kearns-Tribune cases.
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These cases

create a rule of strict construction of the Commission's powers.
Like the Wyoming Supreme court in Public Service Commission v.
Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1982), this Court
has held that unless clearly granted a power by statute, the Commission lacks the authority to act.

In the WWZ Co. case, the

Wyoming Court overturned a lower court ruling that the Wyoming
Public Service Commission had jurisdiction over a sewage disposal
company.

The Court, in rejecting what it characterized as the

lower court's "expansive definitions of words," stated:
[T]he statutes creating and empowering the Public Service
Commission must be strictly construed and any reasonable
doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved against
the exercise thereof.
Id. at 186.

Given the total lack of credible statutory author-

ity, the Court should likewise find that no power exists to order
a pooling arrangement.
In another context, the Commission itself has adhered to a
narrow construction of its powers and jurisdiction.

In a 1983

proceeding in which the Commission decided that one-way paging
was not a public utility service, the Commission grappled with
the question whether an expansive interpretation of the statutory
language was appropriate.

The Commission stated:

[l]f in defining "telephone line" one focuses on the
phrase "facilitate telephone communication," the scope
of potentially regulated servic - becomes staggering.
Conceivably the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone equipment, e.g., Radio Shack, Sears,
J.C. Penney, Panasonic, suppliers of wiring components;
all suppliers of telephone directories, including the
many not affiliated with the Bell System; telephone answering services, telephone answering devices and all
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such suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper classified advertising, ax3 absurdum. The focus instead
should be on the connotation of telephone service which
implies interactive, and at least potentially extended"""
two-way communication* That was certainly the focus in
1917 when the statute was enacted. (Emphasis added).
Application of Page America, Order on Motion for Exempt Certificate at 11 (Case No. 83-082-01, Utah PSC, Nov. 28, 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d
773 (Utah 1986).

In the Page America case there was statutory

language upon which the Commission could have found jurisdiction,
yet the Commission chose not to do so.

In this case, the statu-

tory language does not even exist.
c#

A Rule of Statutory Construction Adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court Demonstrates that the Commission Lacks the Power to
Require Pooling.
There is one situation in which the Commission does have the
power to order a pooling arrangement between telephone utilities
—

the situation where two or more companies provide joint

services.

Section 54-4-12 defines the situation this way:

Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a
physical connection can reasonably be made between the lines
of two or more telephone corporations, or two or more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made to form a continuous line of communication by the construction and maintenance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages
or conversation, and that public convenience and necessity
will be subserved thereby, or shall find that two or more
telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to establish
joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their
said lines and that joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be
established, the commission may, by its order, require that
such connection be made, except where the purpose of such
connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local
messages or conversations between points within the same city
or town, and that conversations be transmitted and messages
transferred over such connections under such rules and regulations as the commission may establish and prescribe, and
that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made
- 19 -

and be used, observed and be in force in the future. If such
telephone or telegraph corporations do not agree upon the
division between themselves of the cost of such physical connection or connections, or upon the division of the joint"
rates, toll or charges established by the commission over
¥uch through lines, the ""commission shall have authority,
after a further hearing, to establish such division by
supplemental order.
(Emphasis added).

Thus, if two telephone companies refuse to

interconnect to provide long distance service, the Commission has
the power to order them to do so.

More importantly, if two com-

panies providing joint service "do not agree between themselves
upon the division of joint rates . . . the Commission shall have
the power to . . . fix the division of such joint rates."

There-

fore, in the absence of agreement, the Commission would have the
power to order a joint rate scheme for the division of intrastate
toll costs and revenues —
pooling arrangement —

such a scheme can take the form of a

if the Commission finds it to be the ap-

propriate means of effecting the division of the costs and
revenues of the joint service.

Traditionally, telephone compa-

nies have entered into pooling arrangements for the division of
costs and revenues for intrasate long distance services that they
are jointly providing.

See, e.g., Lemhi Telephone Co. v.

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 571 P.2d 753 (Idaho
1977).

However, Section 54-4-12 does not apply to Lifeline

service since it is not a jointly provided service.

To be a

jointly provided service, there must be a physical connection
between the two companies relating to the provision of such
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service.7

Obviously, no physical interconnection is involved in

the provision of Lifeline service since Lifeline exists independent of any inter-connection with another telephone company.
Thus, since the Legislature granted the Commission the power
to require pooling where joint services are provided by two or
more companies, the lack of similar explicit authority to require
pooling when the service is not jointly provided, as in the case
of Lifeline service, means that the Commission does not possess
the power in that context.
The principle of statutory construction known as "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius" is the law in Utah.

See Hansen v.

Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983); Cannon v. Gardner,
611 P. 2d 1207, 1209 (Utah 1980); and Olympia Sales Co. v. Long,
604 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1979).

It means that the "expression of

one thing is the exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary
692 (4th Rev. Ed. 1968).

See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wyo-

ming Insurance Dept., 672 P.2d 810, 817 (Wyo. 1983).
ciple is clearly laid out in the Cannon case.

This prin-

There the Salt

Lake County Attorney commenced an action against a candidate who

7.

In a recent Order, the Commission concluded that a physical
connection is an absolute prerequisite to a requirement that
the companies establish joint rates or continue toll pooling
agreements. In re Navajo Communications Co., Report and
Order at 4-5 (consolidated Case Nos. 85-049-06 and 85-050-01,
Utah PSC, February 25, 1986) (A copy of the Order is attached
hereto as Addendum 2, Exhibit F ) . In that case the Commission concluded that Mountain Bell had no continuing duty to
pool long distance revenues with Navajo since, at divestiture, the physical connection between them terminated.
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had been elected county surveyor, attempting to enjoin him from
taking office on the ground that he lacked professional registration as a land surveyor.

The district court enjoined the candi-

date from assuming office.

On appeal, this Court vacated the

injunction, holding that the Legislature had not intended that
county surveyors be required to hold professional credentials.
This conclusion was based on the fact that a separate statute
required a county attorney to be professionally licensed while
there was no similar statute placing the same requirement upon
the surveyor.

The Court, referring to the statute requiring the

county attorney to be professionally qualified, stated:
That enactment providing for professional qualifications for
the county attorney is significant. It shows that the legislature does not leave the professional requirement to be implied. . . . [W]hen it intends that county officials . . .
must have specific qualifications and be licensed it expressly so provides. . . . The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius" is applicable.
Id. at 1209.

Likewise, the fact that the Legislature chose to

grant the Commission the powrer to require pooling in one context
(jointly provided services such as long distance) and was silent
as to that power in a different context, compels the conclusion
that the power does not exist in the other context.

The Commis-

sion thus lacks the power to require pooling in the Lifeline
context.
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III. THE COMMISSION'S POWER TO DEVELOP A LIFELINE RATE MUST
DERIVE FROM ITS RATEMAKING AUTHORITY. A POOLING ARRANGEMENT FOR
LIFELINE SERVICE IS NOT PROPER RATEMAKING.
A.
The Commission's Power to Order a Lifeline Rate is
Derived from its Ratemaking Power.
While there are numerous decisions from other jurisdictions
dealing with lifeline rates, the question of the Utah Commission's authority is defined in Mountain States Legal Foundation
v. Utah Public Service Commission., 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981)•
In that case, a Utah Power & Light (UP&L) rate case, the Commission allocated a portion of the overall increase to residential
customers, with the exception of residences where heads of households were over 65 years of age.

The reduced revenues resulting

from that action were to be made up from the remaining body of
UP&L residential customers.

The reason for the reduced rate for

the benefitted group were that (1) as a group they have annual
incomes less than other family group categories and (2) as a
group they consume less energy per household than residential
units as a whole.
The Court's opinion articulates several important principles.
First, although deference is to be given the Commission orders
relating to the reasonableness of rates and rate structures, "if
the Commission has not acted within the powers delegated to it by
the Legislature . . . an order is contrary to law and must be set
aside."

16_. at 1051.

Second, orders of the Commission must be

based on clear factual findings that demonstrate a rational basis
for its conclusions.
"classify" customers —

Third, the power of the Commission to
in the Lifeline context, to determine who
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will and will not be able to qualify for the reduced rate
flows from the Commission's ratemaking power.

—

The Court stated:

We begin with the general proposition that the power to
classify customers according to common characteristics is
essential to rational ratemaking. Appropriate classification
of customers, if for no other reason, is necessary to maximize the efficient utilization of plant and equipment and
thereby provide the lowest possible rates on an equitable
basis . . . .
Classification of customers must necessarily be accomplished
by reference to general characteristics having some rational
nexus with the criteria used for determining just and reasonable rates.
Id. at 1052-53.

It is thus clear that the power of the Commis-

sion to develop a lifeline rate and provide for its funding is
only in the context of its ratemaking authority and not from some
generalized perception that it can do whatever it perceives to be
in the public interest.8
B. Requiring Mountain Bell to Participate in a Pooling Arrangement is Not a Proper Exercise of the Commission's Ratemaking
Authority.
While invalidating the lifeline electric rate approved by the
Commission, the Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation made it
clear that such a rate structure could be legal pursuant to the
Commission's ratemaking power if based on adequate factual findings.

Such a conclusion is not in any sense a validation of a

pooling scheme among several utilities to fund a lifeline program.

8.

The program considered by the Court in Mountain States

In Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 682
P.2d 858, 861 n.l (Utah 1984) this Court concluded that "the
PSC has no broad authority to 'serve the public interest.'"
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Legal Foundation was, from a funding perspective, structured in
the way Mountain Bell contends is appropriate.

Those UP&L cus-

tomers who did not qualify for lifeline were to be the funding
source for the lower lifeline rates of UP&L lifeline customers.
The customers of other electric companies were not required to
fund UP&L's lifeline program.

UP&L ratepayers were not required

to fund lower rates of lifeline customers in other companies.
Nothing in the Mountain States Legal Foundation decision validates the pooling arrangement as an appropriate funding
mechanism.
Indeed, the fact that the power to institute a lifeline program comes only from the Commission ratemaking power compels the
conclusion that pooling is utterly inconsistent with that power.
The Commission does not regulate rates by industry; it regulates
the rates of individual companies.

As a consequence, its power

to regulate rates applies only to individual companies.
guage of the basic statute authorizing rate regulation —
54-4-4 —

The lanSection

is phrased in terms of the power of the Commission to

regulate the rates of "any public utility".

Nowhere is there

language authorizing the Commission to regulate jointly the rates
of more than one utility, except where they are jointly providing
a single service.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-12.

The cases that have

addressed the Commission's ratemaking power have all proceeded
from the underlying premise that the power extends to rates of
individual companies and not groups of companies.

A recent exam-

ple is Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service
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Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).

In describing the ratemak-

ing process, the Court stated:
Some background discussion concerning utility rate making is
necessary to a consideration of the issues presented. Following lengthy hearings, utility rates are fixed prospectively by the PSC . . . . In determining an appropriate rate,
the PSC considers the utility's historical income and cost
data, as well as predictions of future costs and revenues,
and arrives at a rate which is projected as being adequate to
cover costs and give the utility's shareholders a fair return
on equity. (citations omitted).
Obviously, this Court considers ratemaking to be ci companyspecific proposition.
Cases from other jurisdictions support this concept, even
when dealing with operationally independent divisions of a single
company.

A recent Maine decision illustrates this principle.

Maine Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission., 482 A.2d 443
(Me. 1984), involved a water company with five separate divisions, each of which was "physically and operationally independent" and whose "costs are readily identifiable."

Id. at 456.

In a rate proceeding, the Maine Utilities Commission increased
the rates of four of the divisions, but refused to raise the
rates for the fifth division, even though the current rate levels
in that division were below the cost of providing the service.
As a matter of "rate design," the Commission decided to shift the
burden of the shortfall to the ratepayers in the other four divisions,

^d. at 455.

The Maine Supreme Court concluded, as a

matter of law, that the Commission had exceeded its power, holding that it was inappropriate to burden the ratepayers of the
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other four divisions with the revenue shortfall in the other
division.

jCd. at 456. 9

The Utah Commission's decision to require pooling is even
more tenuous than the Maine Commission's action in the Maine
Water case.

In the Maine Water case, the Commission was at least

dealing with a single company.

In the present case, the

Commission is dealing with completely separate corporate entities, each of which serves separate customers in separate parts
of the state.

The Commission's action is an unprecedented and

highly questionable regulatory policy decision that goes far
beyond the reasonable limits of its power to regulate rates of an
individual utility.
IV. THE POOLING ARRANGEMENT IS A TAX WHICH THE COMMISSION CANNOT
LEGALLY LEVY.
Under Utah law, it is undisputed that the taxing power held
by the Legislature cannot be delegated to any other party, including an administrative agency.

This principle was established

-*-n Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 48
P.2d 526 (Utah 1935).

In that case, the issue was whether the

State Tax Commission had properly assessed sales tax on certain

9.

The idea that separate companies and separate divisions
should pay their own way dates as far back as 1898 when the
Supreme Court held that rates for one rail service could not
be justified by the rates from another rail service. See
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 46, 18 S.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819
(1898). In El Paso Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 667 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1982), the court referred
to this principle as the "stand alone11 concept and stressed
that "its purpose is to avoid cross-subsidization." Id. at
468.
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sales made by a leather supplier.

On appeal, the Tax Commission

argued that "in doubtful cases the ruling of the State Tax Commission, in determining whose duty it is to pay the sales tax,
should not be interferred with by the courts."

.Id. at 527.

In

rejecting that argument and in overturning the Tax Commission's
assessment, the Court stated:
The power vested in the commission to prescribe rules and
regulations for making returns for ascertaining assessment
and collection of the tax imposed by the act does not vest in
the commission any discretion whatsoever in the matter
requiring the payment of a sales tax by any one other than
such as are designated in the act. It is true that an administrative body within prescribed limits, and when authorized by the lawmaking power, may make rules and regulations calculated to carry into effect the expressed legislative intention. Under our State Constitution the legislative
power of the state shall be vested:
"L
In a Senate and House of Representatves which shall
be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah.
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter
stated." Constitution of Utah, art. 6, § 1.
The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to
others the essential legislative function with which it is~"
thus vested. The imposition of a tax and the" designation "of
those who must pay the same is such an essential legislative
function as may not be transferred to others « (emphasis
added) .
Id. at 527-28.

This basic principle was expressly reaffirmed in

State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977).

It is therefore

clear that, although the Legislature has appropriately delegated
some of its legislative authority —
—

such as its ratemaking power

to the Commission, the Legislature could not, even if it

desired to do so, delegate the power to levy a tax.
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A tax by any other name is still a tax.

It has been defined

as "the enforced contribution of persons and property levied by
the authority of the state."

Arizona Department of Revenue v.

Transamerica Title, 604 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Ariz. 1979).

When care-

fully analyzed, the Lifeline pooling arrangement is clearly a tax
upon Mountain Bell and its customers.

Through its Rules, the

Commission forced Mountain Bell to raise its rates to provide
revenue with which to subsidize local exchange service for low
income families who are not Mountain Bell's customers.

Under the

logic of Mountain States Legal Foundation case, supra, the Commission's ratemaking authority could appropriately require
Mountain Bell non-Lifeline customers to fund lower rates for
Mountain Bell Lifeline customers.10

However, once the Commission

required Mountain Bell customers to subsidize Lifeline customers
in other companies (i.e., once the subsidy flowed beyond the
boundaries of Mountain Bell's service territory), the Commission
crossed the boundary between appropriate ratemaking and illegal
taxation.
The Contel witness argued for pooling on the ground that
Lifeline "is a social program for the benefit of society." (R.
183).

In requiring pooling, the Commission has treated the

program in just the way Mr. Carrier characterized it.

If the

10. Mountain Bell was an active supporter of Lifeline and took
the position that if funded on a company-specific basis, it
was a legitimate exercise of the Commission's ratemaking
power.

program is a social program, then it should be funded by the
Legislature using state tax revenues rather than through a taxing
mechanism illegally approved by an administrative agency.H
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court should set aside
those portions of the Lifeline Rules and Orders that require the
pooling arrangement for the Lifeline program.
DATED this 31st day of July, 1987*
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY

Te^3 D. Smith, Attorney
Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney

11. It is curious'that under the Rule finally adopted, the local
access surcharges are imposed only on "non-lifeline customers
of the local exchange carriers offering Lifeline telephone
service." (R. 634). Yet in its denial of Mountain Bell's
requests for rehearing, the Commission noted that it "would
be unjust and unreasonable to impose the Lifeline program on
a Company specific basis." (R. 675). Thus, while characterizing lifeline as being "in the best interests of all
telephone customers in Utah" (R. 647), the Commission only
requires those non-Lifeline customers in participating companies to fund the program. The reason surcharges were not
imposed upon customers in non-participating companies is
fairly obvious. To do so would clearly go beyond the Commission's ratemaking power into the area of illegal taxation.
Yet there is no practical or legal distinction between forcing customers of non-participating companies to fund lifeline
rates and in requiring Mountain Bell ratepayers to subsidize
lifeline rates in other companies.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1 - STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(8) (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-5 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-7 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-12 (1986)
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EXHIBIT A - LIFELINE RULES Adopted by Utah Public Service
Commission - December 1, 1986 Case No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT B - December 17, 1986 Report and Order in Case
No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT C - December 17, 1986 Report and Order in Case
No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT D - January 12, 1987 Order Denying Rehearing in
Case No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT E - February 4, 1987 Order Denying Rehearing
in Case No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT F - February 25, 1986 Report and Order in Case
Nos. 85-049-06 and 85-050-01.

ADDENDUM 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann* § 54-4-1 (1986)
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the
business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether
herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however,
that the department of transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety
functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act.
U t a h Code A n n .

§ 54-4-5

(1986)

Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing, that the rates, fares or
charges in force over the lines of two or more common carriers between any
two points in this state are unjust, unreasonable or excessive, or that no
satisfactory through route or joint rate, fare or charge exists between such
points, or that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment of
a through route and joint rate, fare or charge between such points, the commission shall order such common carriers to establish such through route, and
may establish and fix a joint rate, fare or charge which will be fair, just,
reasonable and sufficient to be allowed, charged, enforced, demanded and
collected in the future, and the terms and conditions under which such
through route shall be operated. The commission may order that freight moving between such points shall be carried by the different common carriers,
parties to such through route and joint rate, without being transferred from
the originating cars. In case the common carriers do not agree between themselves upon the division of the joint rates, fares or charges established by the
commission over such through routes, the commission shall, after hearing, by
supplementary order establish such division. The commission shall have the
power to establish and fix through routes and joint rates, fares or charges for
common carriers, and to fix the division of such joint rates, fares or charges.

U t a h Code A n n .

§ 54-4-7

(1986)

Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that the rules,, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or
supply employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate or insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable,
safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules, regulations, practices, equipment,
appliances, facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, constructed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its order, rule or
regulation. The commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe rules and regulations for the performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of
the character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on proper demand and tender of rates such public utility shall furnish such commodity or
render such service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such
rules.

U t a h Code Ann.

§ 54-4-12

(1986)

Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a physical connection can reasonably be made between the lines of two or more telephone
corporations, or two or more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made
to form a continuous line of communication by the construction and maintenance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages or conversations,
and that public convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby, or shall
find that two or more telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to establish joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their said lines and that
joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be established, the commission may, by
its order, require that such connection be made, except where the purpose of
such connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or
conversations between points within the same city or town, and that conversations be transmitted and messages transferred over such connections under
such rules and regulations as the commission may establish and prescribe,
and that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made and be used,
observed and be in force in the future. If such telephone or telegraph corporations do not agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of such
physical connection or connections, or upon the division of the joint rates, tolls
or charges established by the commission over such through lines, the commission shall have authority, after a further hearing, to establish such division by supplemental order.

ADDENDUM 2 - PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION RULES AND ORDERS
EXHIBIT A - LIFELINE RULES Adopted by Utah Public Service
Commission - December 1, 1986 Case No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT B - December 17, 1986 Report and Order in Case
No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT C - December 17, 1986 Report and Order in Case
No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT D - January 12, 1987 Order Denying Rehearing in
Case No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT E - February 4, 1987 Order Denying Rehearing
in Case No. 85-999-13
EXHIBIT F - February 25, 1986 Report and Order in Case
Ncs. 85-049-06 and 85-050-01.

EXHIBIT A

LIFELINE

RULES

APPROVE BY COMMISSIONERS
BRIAN T.STEWART ft' ^
'''('»»>
BRENT H. CAMERON JtH

JAMES M. BYRNE

feW'*

Applicability
(1)

Any local exchange carrier whose monthly single-party
residential local exchange service flat rate (excluding
mileage or extended area service charges that may be
included in a carrier's flat rate), or combined access
line and usage rate equals or exceeds the amount
allocated for telephone service in the Standard Needs
Budget of the Utah Department of Social Services times
the percentage of the Standard Needs Budget funded by
the Utah State Legislature, as determined at the end of
the legislative session, shall establish a
lifeline
telephone service pursuant to the requirements of
Sections II through V
(i.e. for 1986, $18.00 X
52.5% = $9.45).

(2)

Any local exchange carrier that provides single-party
residential local exchange service at a monthly rate
less than that required above, may establish a lifeline
telephone service pursuant to the requirements of
Sections II through V, upon making application and
receiving approval from the Public Service Commission.

Eligibility Requirements
(1)

(2)

The local exchange carrier shall provide lifeline
telephone service to any applicant that self-certifies,
that they are currently eligible (though it is not
necessary that they be participating) for public
assistance under one of the following programs:
(a)

Aid to Families with Dependent Children;

(b)

Emergency Work Program;

(c)

Food Stamps;

(d)

General Assistance;

(e)

Home Energy Assistance Target Program;

(f)

Medical Assistance;

(g)

Refugee Assistance; or

(h)

Supplemental Security Income.

The term "applicant" as used in Paragraph (1) refers to
a head of household or person in whose name the property or rental agreement resides.

<ft

(3)

Self-certification will be upon a form supplied by the
local exchange carrier or the Department of Social
Services which contains the following:
(a)

applicant's name, current
social security number;

(b)

a request for lifeline service;

(c)

an
affirmative
statement
that
qualifies for lifeline service;

(d)

a statement as to whether the person is participating in one of the programs set out in Section (1) above or is simply eligible for such
program;

(e)

a statement that the applicant understands that if
he/she is later shown to have falsely
selfcertified for the lifeline program, that he/she
will be responsible for the difference between the
lifeline.rate and the otherwise applicable rate;

(f)

a statement whether
and

(g)

signature.

this

telephone

number,

the

and

applicant

is a reconnect or

not;

Verification Procedures
(1)

At least annually, the local exchange carriers offering
lifeline telephone service shall
provide the Utah
Department of Social Services with computer tapes,
written list, or personal computer disk, listing
their
lifeline service customers and their social security
numbers.

(2)

Lifeline telephone customers who do not participate in
any of the programs listed in Section I I , but who are
qualified to participate in such programs, shall be
certified by the Utah Department of Social Services as
being eligible for any of the qualifying programs, and
shall thereafter be included on a "Lifeline Only"
verification
list
maintained
by
the
Department.
Lifeline customers on such "Lifeline Only" list will be
required to annually recertify with the Utah Department
of Social Services to verify their continued eligibility for lifeline telephone serv: r ^,

(3)

Any lifeline telephone service customer that fails to
appear on the Utah Department of Social Service's
listing of public assistance program participants, or
"Lifeline Only" list, will become ineligible for the
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lifeline telephone rate. The local exchange carrier
shall notify such customer that such customer is now
ineligible and is no longer entitled to the lifeline
telephone service rate.

IV.

(4)

Any subscriber denied lifeline telephone service under
Paragraph (3) above shall be entitled to resubscribe to
lifeline service only after the local exchange carrier
providing telephone service to such subscriber has
received confirmation from the Utah Department of
Social Services that the discontinued lifeline telephone service subscriber is currently a participant in
a state public assistance program, or is qualified to
participate in such programs.

(5)

Any lifeline telephone service customer who does not
qualify and has falsely self-certified and participated
in the lifeline program will be responsible for the
difference between the lifeline rate and the otherwise
applicable rate for the length of time the customer
subscribed to lifeline telephone service for which the
customer was not eligible. The local exchange carrier
may, at its option, choose to backbill the customer for
such amount.

Lifeline Telephone Service Features

The lifeline telephone program shall apply to any
residence class or grade of service provided by local exchange
carriers in Utah. Local exchange carriers shall provide the
following features in a lifeline telephone service, to eligible
subscribers:
(1)

Those who are eligible for lifeline telephone service
shall pay a rate for monthly basic local service which
is equal to:
(a)

(b)
(2)

the amount allocated for telephone service in the
Standard Needs Budget of the Utah Department of
Social Services times the percentage of the
Standard Needs Budget funded by the Utah State
Legislature, as determined at the end of the
legislative session, shall establish a lifeline
telephone service pursuant to the requirements of
Sections II through V (i.e. for 1986, $18.00 X
52.5% = $9.45) , plus
any Extended Area Service (EAS) charges.

Customer security deposit requirements will be waived
for lifeline telephone service subscribers unless such
subscriber has had a prior credit problem with, or has
an outstanding bill with any local exchange carrier.

•3-
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V.

(3)

Lifeline telephone service subscribers will receive a
fifty (50) per cent reduction in the line connection or
reconnection charge, but only once during any twelve
(12) month period.
The subscriber will be entitled to
pay the line connection or reconnection charge in no
more than three monthly installments.

(4)

Lifeline telephone service subscribers will receive a
waiver of the nonrecurring service charge for changing
the type of local exchange usage service to lifeline
service, or changing from flat rate service to message
rate service, or vice versa, but only once during any
twelve (12) month period.

(5)

Lifeline telephone service
following restrictions:

will

be

subject

to

the

(a)

Applicants must be head of household or person in
whose
name
the property
or
rental
agreement
resides.

(b)

Lifeline telephone service will only be
to the applicant's principle residence.

(c)

A-lifeline telephone service subscriber will only
be allowed to subscribe to a single residential
access line.

provided

Reporting Requirements

Local
exchange
carriers
shall
file
a
semi-annual
report, by January 31 and July 31, on their lifeline telephone
service program. Companies with less than 5,000 access lines
shall only file a report annually by January 31.
This report
shall include the following information:
(1)

administrative
costs
associated
telephone service* program;

(2)

number of new
subscribers;

(3)

number of lifeline telephone service subscribers
are new local exchange service subscribers;

that

(4)

number of lifeline telephone service subscribers
are reconnecting local exchange service;

that

(5)

number of lifeline
exchange area; and

subscribers

by

(6)

number of lifeline telephone service subscribers
type of local exchange usage service rate.

by

and

total

lifeline

telephone

-4-

with

the

telephone

service

lifeline
service
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Funding of Lifeline
(1)

Eighty percent (80%) of the total cost of providing
lifeline
telephone service statewide, including the
administrative costs of
the local exchange carriers,
shall be
funded from a surcharge imposed upon the
non-lifeline
customers of the local exchange carriers
offering
lifeline telephone service.

(2)

Twenty percent (20%) of the total cost of providing
lifeline
telephone service statewide, including the
administrative costs of the Public Service Commission
in administering the pool discussed in Paragraph (3)
below and the Utah Department of Social Services, shall
be funded from a surcharge imposed upon all intrastate
toll and access services in the State of Utah.
Such
surcharge shall be pooled and distributed as set out in
Paragraph (3).

(3)

The Public Service Commission shall be the administrator of the lifeline pool referred to in Paragraph (2)
with the following duties:

(4)

(a)

verifying the costs of providing lifeline
phone service in the State of Utah;

(b)

calculating the surcharge on intrastate toll and
access services sufficient to fund twenty percent
(20%) of the cost of providing lifeline telephone
services, including the administrative costs of
the Public Service Commission and the Utah Department of Social Services, as set out in Section 4
below; and

(c)

distributing
to
each
local
exchange
carrier
offering lifeline telephone service a share of
such pool so as to equalize statewide the amount
of the local service surcharge paid by customers
of
such
carriers
to
fund
lifeline
telephone
service.

(a)

The Public Service Commission shall hold a hearing
for the purpose of establishing two statewide
surcharge rates which it deems reasonable to
provide for the funding of lifeline telephone
service.

(b)

One rate will fund eighty percent (80%) of the
costs of providing lifeline telephone service,
including the administrative costs of the local
exchange carriers, and will be imposed upon the
non-lifeline
customers
of
the
local
exchange
carriers offering lifeline telephone service.

-5-
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(5)

(c)

The second rate will fund twenty percent (20%) of
the costs of providing lifeline telephone service,
including the administrative costs of the Public
Service Commission in administrating the referenced pool and the Utah Department of Social
Services, and will be imposed upon all intrastate
toll and access services.

(d)

The Public Service Commission shall review such
surcharges annually, or more often upon petition
by the Division of Public Utilities or any telephone company whose customers are paying the
surcharge.

Thirty (30) days following approval of the surcharges
referred to in Section 4 above, the lifeline telephone
service of the local exchange carriers required to
offer such service shall go into effect.

EXHIBIT B

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Rulemaking
for the Establishment of Telephone Lifeline Rates for All
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the State of Utah

CASE NO. 85-999-13
REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED:

December 17, 1986

Appearances:
Ted Smith

For

Mountain Bell

John W. Horsley

"

Continental Telephone
Company

James J. Cassity

H

Utah Independent
Telephone Association

Gary B. Witt
Brian W. Burnett,
Assistant Attorney
General
Bernard M. Tanner,
Assistant Attorney
General
Bruce Plenk

H

AT&T Communication

"

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State of Utah
Committee of Consumer
Services

w

Salt Lake Community
Action Program and Utah
Issues

By the Commission:
This matter came to hearing before the Commission on
December 1, 1986 after a continuance was granted to allow the
parties to reach agreement on the issues of the operation of the
lifeline pool and the amount of surcharges for lifeline telephone
service in the state of Utah.
a stipulation on all issues.

The parties subsequently presented
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The Commission, having received a "Proposed Settlement
Stipulation" dated December 1, 1986 from all parties in this
matter and being fully advised in the premises, now makes this
report containing the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and the Order based thereon.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates,

data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost
projections for lifeline telephone service provided by:

(a)

Beehive Telephone Company; (b) Contel; and (c) Mountain Bell; as
presented in Attachments 1 thru 3 of the Stipulation.
2.

All parties agree that the local exchange carriers

required to provide lifeline telephone service shall file tariff
revisions within twenty days of the date of the Commission's
order in this matter to implement a lifeline telephone service
surcharge rate at $0.18 per access line (trunk) for non-lifeline
subscribers.
3.

All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates,

data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost
projections

for

(a)

the

Commission's

administration

of

the

lifeline telephone service surcharge revenue pool and the Utah
Department of Social Service's administration of the lifeline
telephone service eligibility and verification procedures; (b)
the lifeline telephone service revenue requirement that should be
recovered from the surcharges on intra-LATA toll services and on
intra-LATA and inter-LATA switched access services (pursuant to
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the Commission's Rule, 20 percent of Section 2 (a)); and (c) the
surcharge rate percentage for subscribers of intra-LATA toll
services

and

for

intra-LATA

and

inter-LATA

switched

access

services as presented in Attachment 4 of the Stipulation.
4.

All parties agree that all local exchange and

intrastate interexchange carriers regulated by the Commission
shall be required to file tariff revisions within twenty days of
the date of the Commission's order in this matter to implement
lifeline telephone service surcharge rates based on:

(a) 0.65

percent of the subscriber's monthly bill for intrastate intraLATA

and

inter-LATA message

toll) services

telecommunications

(and optional

(MTS) and wide-area telecommunications service

(WATS); and (b) 1.88 percent of the monthly bill for intrastate
intra-LATA and inter-LATA switched access services provided to
resale carriers

(Defined, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section

54-2-1 (30), as "any person which provides, on a resale basis,
any telephone or telecommunication service which is purchased
from a telephone corporation.").
5.

All parties agree that six months after the imple-

mentation date for the lifeline telephone service and the surcharge rates, and every six months thereafter, the Commission
shall conduct a proceeding to:
(a) Review the local exchange carriers' semi-annual lifeline telephone service reports, filed pursuant to the
Commission's rule;

CASE NO. 85-999-13
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(b)

Review the amount of surcharge revenues collected
non-lifeline
access

local

service

exchange

service,

subscribers

during

MTS,

the

from

WATS

and

preceding

six

months;
(c)

Review

requests

lifeline

by

local

telephone

exchange

service

carriers

for

providing

payments

from

the

surcharge revenue pool f as presented in Attachment 5 of
the Stipulation;
(d)

Review

requests

Department
surcharge
costs

of

by

the

Social

revenue

associated

Commission

Services

pool
with

to

for

cover

the

and

by

the

payments

their

lifeline

Utah

from

the

administrative

telephone

service

program?
(e)

Receive

surcharge

carriers

regulated

exchange

carriers

revenue

payments

by

the

Commission

that

do

not provide

phone

service, pursuant

to

which

collect

revenues

lifeline

from

surcharge

telephone

interexchange

and

from

local

lifeline

tele-

the Commission's

service

in

revenue

excess

rule, or
of

their

requirement

(see

Attachment 5 of the Stipulation);
(f)

Review

the

lifeline
quirements

local

exchange

telephone
and

service

surcharge

carriers 1

projections

subscribers,

revenues

for

revenue
the

of
re-

next

six

months.
(g)

Review actions by the State Legislature to increase or
decrease

the

funded

portion

of

the

Standard

Needs

CASE NO. 85-999-13
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Budget

of

the

Utah

Department

of

Social

Services

attributable for telephone service;
(h)

Consider revisions in the level of the lifeline telephone service rate or the surcharge rates.
6.

all

filings

The Division agrees that it shall audit and review
by

the

local

exchange

service summary review proceeding

carriers

in

the

lifeline

for accuracy and reasonable-

ness.
7.
local

All parties agree with the cost studies used by

exchange

installation

carriers

costs

to

estimate

for lifeline

their

telephone

administrative
service.

and

Such cost

studies shall be furnished to the Commission thirty days prior to
the first summary review proceeding and every two years thereafter.
8#

All parties agree that any revisions in the local

exchange carriers1 rates for residential local exchange services,
MTS, WATS or switched access services which would affect their
lifeline

telephone

service

revenue

requirements

or

surcharge

revenues shall be reviewed in the next lifeline service review
proceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The adoption of this Stipulation by the Commission

will be in the best interest of the public and will benefit the
State of Utah.
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2.

The

Commission

has

the

authority

stipulation in any proceeding before it.

to

approve

a

Section 54-7-1, Utah

Code readst
"Information resolution, by agreement of the
parties, of matters before the commission
shall be encouraged. These agreements shall
be subject to the approval of the commission
and the commission shall give due regard to
the interests of the public and other affected persons before issuing orders approving
any agreement*"
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Stipulation presented to the Commission be and is hereby approved and
adopted by the Commission

and

that the bench order is hereby

affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That all local exchange carriers
and

interexchange

carriers

regulated

by

this

Commission

file

tariffs in twenty days (20) as agreed to in the Stipulation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the surcharge rates for the
support of

lifeline

telephone

service by

$0.18 per month per

access line (trunk), 0.65 percent of billed revenue of toll and
wide

area

percent

telephone

of

service, intra

intrastate

access

and

inter

services

LATA,

billed

and

1.88

revenue

for

non-regulated interexchange carriers.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED, That

lifeline

service

shall

begin on January 1, 1^87, and be subject to a review in totality
in approximately one year from that date.
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of December, 1986,

_. fast /
( dfai
£/*.<*//Brian T/. Stewart A Chairman
(
— = - =

»

—

\

-H

*

*

"

.

"

Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner
<^2>*~i^>^
J a m ^ M. Byrne, Commissioner
Attest:

Stephen'C. Hewlett
Commission Secretary
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EXHIBIT C

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Rulemaking
for the Establishment of Telephone Lifeline Rates for All
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the State of Utah

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 85-999-13
REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED:

December 17, 1986

Appearances:
For

Ted Smith

Mountain Bell

John W. Horsley

*

Continental Telephone
Company

James J. Cassity

n

Utah Independent
Telephone Association

Gary B. Witt
Brian W. Burnett,
Assistant Attorney
General
Bernard M. Tanner,
Assistant Attorney
General

M

AT&T Communication

"

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State of Utah
Committee of Consumer
Services

"

Salt Lake Community
Action Program and Utah
Issues

Bruce Plenk

By the Commission:
On
instituting

June

20,

rulemaking

1985,

proceedings

telephone lifeline rates.
to a Division of

the

Commission
for

the

issued

that

June

of

Rulemaking was instituted in response

Public Utilities

on

order

establishment

(the "Division") memorandum

received by the Commission on April 29, 1985.
indicated

an

1,

1985

the

Federal

The memorandum
Communication

nnofid^
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upon all residential customer access lines.

The charge was to be

increased to two dollars ($2.00) on June 1, 1986.
The memorandum further stated that the FCC had adopted
by its order of December 27, 1985 the Federal-State Joint Board's
recommendation that the FCC implement federal lifeline assistance
measures to assist low-income households in securing telephone
service.

The order provides for a waiver of the federal residen-

tial customer access charge upon condition that the state adopt a
qualifying plan for local lifeline assistance.

To qualify the

local plan must satisfy the following criteria:
1. The End User Common Line Charge (also
referred to as the subscriber line charge or
CALC) for residential subscribers shall be
reduced to the extent the state assistance
equals or exceeds the residential End User
Common Line Charge.
2. In order to qualify for this waiver, the
subscriber must be eligible for and receive
assistance or benefits provided pursuant to a
narrowly targeted state lifeline assistance
plan requiring verification of eligibility,
implemented by the state or the loccil telephone company.
3.
The state assistance shall include
reduced rates for local telephone service,
service connection charges and customer
deposits, except that benefits or assistance
for connection charges and deposit requirements may only be counted once annually.
Such benefits must be for a single telephone
line, the household's principal residence.
The Division's memorandum further states:
"...that the House and Senate sponsors of
federal legislation which mandate state
lifeline service have delayed action on their
bills until after they have evaluated the
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missions to their concerns."

State Com-

On July 2, 1985, a prehearing conference was held
before

the

Commission.

At

the

conference,

several' parties

suggested issues to be discussed in the evidentiary portion of
the proceeding, and the schedule was established for filing of
legal briefs, testimony and a date for hearing.
On September 5, 1985, the Commission issued a Prehearing Order and Notice of Hearing.

In that Order, the Commission

asked that the parties address several issues, one of which was
whether or not the Commission had authority to establish lifeline
rates.

The Commission

further

ordered

hearings

to be held

December 16, 1985.
The Commission heard arguments on the issue of the
Commission's authority to set lifeline rates on December 16,
1985.

All parties agreed that the Commission was vested with

sufficient authority to order a lifeline telephone service rate.
Based upon the legal arguments of the parties, the
Commission issued a declaratory order on January 3, 1986, which
concluded

that

the Commission

had

authority

to construct a

lifeline telephone service for low-income subscribers.
On February 18, 1986, the Commission held hearings on
the design of rates and the classification of the ratepayer who
would qualify to obtain the lower "lifeline'1 rate. Testimony was
presented by the parties, as well as by public witnesses on
Public Witness Day, February 20, 1986.

The parties1 witnesses

were as follows:
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The Division of Public Utilities presented testimony
through

Gary

B.

through

Orville

Hinton.
K.

Mountain

Unruh.

Bell

Theodore

presented

testimony

Carrier

presented

J.

testimony for Continental Telephone Company, Perry A. Arana and
Raymond A. Hendershot were witnesses for the Utah Independent
Telephone Association.
Communications.

Diane Roth presented testimony for AT&T

Joe Duke-Rosati was the witness for Salt Lake

Community Action Program.

R. Phil Bullock

and Timothy Funk

testified for the Committee of Consumer Services.
Based

upon

the

testimony

and

documentary

evidence

adduced in this matter, the Commission will make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
90.3 percent

Nationally, the telephone penetration rate is about
(90.3%) for all classes of customers.

income persons

(who are defined

For low-

hereinafter by reference to

eligibility for public welfare assistance programs) the penetration rate is 72 percent (72%) , a differential of almost 20
percent (20%) .

In the Mountain Bell service area and in Utah

specifically, the overall subscriber rate for telephone service
is approximately ninety-five percent
households

the rate is about

(95%).

20 percent

Among low-income
(20%) less.

Among

apartment dwellers in Mountain Bell's service area, 71 percent
(71%) of those who have terminated telephone service report that
they could no longer afford the service and as of April, 1984,
only 63.2 percent (63.2%) of participants in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children had telephone service.
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Beyond

that,

it

appears

that

future

customer

drop-off will be significant among low-income subscribers, since
low-income households have fewer discretionary funds and are at
greater risk of losing phone service as basic telephone rates
increase.
3.

The Commission has long supported the policy of

universal service, by which is meant the offering of affordable
telephone service to as many of the citizens of the State as
possible.

This policy is likewise endorsed and supported by the

Congress and the Federal Communications Commission.
4.

Universal service offers substantial benefits to

all customers.

The promotion of universal service means more

subscribers in the telephone network and greater communications
access to all.

Greater access enhances business and quality of

life.

access

Greater

results

in greater

efficiency

in the

delivery of state social services programs and, thus, better use
of tax dollars.

Maintaining subscribers in the network avoids

the stranding of capital facilities.
5. A lifeline rate will promote universal service and,
thereby, be in the best interests of all telephone customers in
the State, both local and toll.

We conclude that there are sound

economic reasons for establishing a distinct class of low-income
residence customers with a lower service rate level than the
remaining body of residence customers.
6.

In its rules, the Commission requires that tele-

phone companies, whose basic service rates exceed the amount
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by the State Legislature for the Department of Social Service,
establish a lifeline telephone service.

The amount allocated in

the Standard Need^ Budget at the end of the last
session was $9.45.

legislative

Under the lifeline rules, the recipient of a

lifeline rate must pay the funded portion of the Standard Needs
Budget plus Extended Area Services

(EAS) charges.

We conclude

that such an approach is fair and reasonable in that it ties the
amount of rate relief given to lifeline recipients to an objective figure developed by the State Legislature and assures that
lifeline recipients will not receive more in support for telephone

service

through

lifeline

rates

and

the

Standard

Needs

Budget than the rate for service.

eligible

7.

The rules provide that any person who is currently

for

one

or

more

of

the

following

state

assistance

programs shall be eligible for the lifeline rate:
(a)

Aid to Families with Dependent Children;

(b)

Emergency Work Program;

(c)

Food Stamps;

(d)

General Assistance;

(e)

Home Energy Assistance Target Program;

(f)

Medical Assistance;

(g)

Refugee Assistance; or

(h)

Supplemental Security Income

8.

The foregoing programs provide a reasonable basis

for identifying those person in the state who, because of their

nnnfMs
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- 7 income limitations, do not have telephone service or who may be
compelled

to disconnect

basic service increase.

their

telephone

service

as rates

for

Tying lifeline service to these programs

recognizes and adopts the Legislature's conclusions about which
persons are most in need of public assistance.

By adopting these

programs as eligibility criteria, we also ensure that existing
mechanisms

for

determining

mechanisms

provide

a

eligibility

reasonable

verifying continued eligibility

and

are

utilized,

cost-effective

for lifeline service.

which

means

of

On bal-

ance, our finding that these categories are fair and reasonable
takes

advantage

of

prior

legislative

findings

that

program

recipients are truly in need of assistance while at the same time
facilitating

reasonable qualifications

and verification proce-

dures.
9.
Service will

We conclude that the rules for Lifeline Telephone
address

the needs

of

the

low-income

residential

subscribers.
10.
pertaining

to

The Commission has the authority
lifeline

telephone

service

54-4-1, 54-4-4(2), 54-4-7 and particularly

to adopt rules

pursuant

to

Section

54-3-1, Utah Code.

The latter section reads in pertinent part:
"The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include, but shall not be limited
to, the cost of providing service to each
category of customer, economic impact of
charges on each category of customer, and on
the well-being of the State of Utah;" (emphasis added)

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 8 About Section 54-3-1, Utah Code, as cited above, the
Supreme Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public
Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), stated:
"The 19 77 amendments to Section 54-3-1, by
permitting consideration of the economic
impact of a rate on each category of customers , gave legislative approval, in the form
of binding law, to considerations which may
relate, directly or indirectly, to "social
problems." (emphasis added)
It is evident that the Court has concluded that the
Commission has authority to enact a lifeline telephone rate to
meet the needs of a distinct class of low-income residential
customers under existing law.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That:
1.

The rules for Lifeline Telephone Service heretofore

adopted and made effective December 1, 1986 as filed with the
State Archivist, are hereby

affirmed

and

implemented

to be

effective January 1, 1987.
2.

The companion order issued this date in this same

docket by which the Commission has adopted a stipulation of the
parties on the issues of the operation of the lifeline pool and
the amount of the surcharges for lifeline telephone service in
the State of Utah is hereby affirmed and implemented to take
effect January 1, 1987.
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- 9DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of December, 1986.
Br^an T.j Stewart I Chairman
\')1A£

a* *>(-*('-

B r e n t H. Camferon,

_^

<•

Commissxoner

v A y$$ uxs

James M. Byrne, Commissioner
Attest:

Stephen1 C. Hewlett
Commission Secretary

EXHIBIT D

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Rulemaking
of the Establishment of Telephone LIFELINE RATES for all
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the State of Utah

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 85-999-13
ORDER DENYING REHEARING

ISSUED:

January 12, 1987

By the Commission:
On December 22, 1986, the Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) filed a Petition for Review or
Rehearing of Section VI of the Lifeline Rules adopted by the
Commission on December 1, 1986.
of its Petition

Mountain Bell recited in support

that the Commission

lacked

the statutory and

constitutional authority to adopt a rule requiring Mountain Bell
to

participate

in

a

pooling

Lifeline telephone service.

arrangement

for

the

funding

of

Mountain Bell further asserted that

the Commission had failed to make adequate findings of fact to
support a rule requiring a pooling arrangement.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
had

In our Order of December 17, 1986 we found that we

statutory authority

to adopt rules pertaining

to lifeline

telephone service pursuant to Section 54-4-1, 54-4-4(2), 54-4-7
and 54-3-1 Utah Code Ann.

(See Finding #10 page 7 Commission

Order dated December 7, 1986).

In a companion Order of December

CASE NO, 85-999-13
- 2 17, 1986, we accepted a proposed stipulation which established
the mechanism for the funding of the program which Mountain Bell
now disputes .

In that Order we did not rule on the issue of

whether we had jurisdiction to require Mountain Bell and the
other independent exchange carriers to participate in a pooling
arrangement for the funding of Lifeline telephone service because
we believed that all parties to the stipulation were in agreement
that pooling was the only presently workable mechanism to fund
the Lifeline program.

Aside from the stipulation, we do believe

that there is sufficient statutory authority for us to require
pooling.

Section 54-4-5 Utah Code Ann, specifically states that

the Commission "shall have the power to establish and fix through
routes and joint rates, fares or charges for common carriers, and
to fix the division of such joint rates, fares or charges."
Section 54-4-7 Utah Code Ann, states that the Commission after
hearing "shall prescribe rules and regulations for the Performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of the
character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on
proper demand and tender of rates such public utility shall
furnish such commodity or render such service within the time and
upon the conditions proviced in such rules."

Based upon the

statutory authority provided in Sections 54-4-5 and 54-4-7 Utah
Code Ann. we conclude that we have the statutory authority to
require the parties to participate in a pooling arrangement for
the funding of the Lifeline program.
2.

Based upon the testimony and evidence presented to

000674
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- 3 us in our rulemaking hearing on this matter, we concluded that it
would be unjust and unreasonable to impose the Lifeline program
on a company specific basis as Mountain Bell proposed because the
Independent

Local

Exchange

forced to so dramatically

Carriers

(Independents)

would

be

increase the rates charged to their

non-lifeline subscribers as to make the program unworkable.

We

concluded that there was no other alternative mechanism to fund
the Lifeline program than through the pooling of funds.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

and

good

cause

appearing

therefore, the Commission will make the following
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Mountain
Bell's Petition for Review and Rehearing of Section VI of the
Lifeline Rules is hereby denied.
DATED

at

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah,

this

12th

day

of

January, 1987.

Attest:

Stephen C. Hewlett
Commission Secretary

000675

EXHIBIT E

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH In the Matter of the Rulemaking
of the Establishment of Telephone LIFELINE RATES for all
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the State of Utah.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO, 85-999-13
ORDER DENYING REHEARING

ISSUED:

February 4, 1987

By the Commission:
On January 6, 1986, the Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) filed a Petition for Review and
Rehearing of the companion orders entered by the Commission on
December 17, 1986, which stated that the Commission lacked the
statutory and constitutional authority to adopt a rule requiring
Mountain Bell to participate in a pooling arrangement for the
funding of Lifeline telephone service and that the Commission
failed to make adequate

findings of fact to support a rule

requiring pooling arrangement.
Mountain

Bell

previously

filed

an Application

for

Review and Rehearing on December 19, 1986 of the Rules adopted by
the Commission on December 1, 1986 which was subsequently denied
by the Commission on December 1, 1986 which was subsequently
denied by the Commission.

See Order Denying Rehearing dated

January 12, 1987.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In our Order of December 17, 1986, we found that we

had statutory authority to adopt rules pertaining to Lifeline
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and 54-3-1 Utah Code Ann, (See Finding #10, page 7, Commission
Order dated December 17, 1986).

In a companion Order of December

17, 1986, we accepted a Proposed Stipulation which established
the mechanism for the funding of the program which Mountain Bell
now disputes.

In that Order we did not rule on the issue of

whether we had jurisdiction to require Mountain Bell and the
other independent exchange carriers (Independents) to participate
in a pooling arrangement for the funding of the Lifeline telephone service because we believed that all parties to the Stipulation were in agreement that pooling was the only presently
workable mechanism to fund the Lifeline program.

Aside from the

Stipulation, we do believe that there is sufficient statutory
authority for us to require pooling.

Section 54-4-5 Utah Code

Ann, specifically states that the Commission

"shall have the

power to establish and fix through routes and joint rates, fares
or charges for common carriers, and to fix the division of such
joint rates, fares or charges."

Section 54-4-7 Utah Code Ann,

states that the Commission after hearing "shall prescribe rules
and regulations for the performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of the character furnished or supplied
by any public utility, and on proper demand and tender of rates
such public utility shall furnish such commodity or render such
service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such
rules."

Based upon the statutory authority provided in Sections

54-4-5 and 54-4-7 Utah Code Ann., we conclude that we have the

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 3 statutory authority to require the parties to participate in a
pooling arrangement for the funding of the Lifeline program.
2.
witness

According to the testimony of Theodore J. Carrier

for Continental

Telephone

(Contel), Contel customers

would have to pay a substantially higher rate than Mountain Bell
customers to fund Lifeline service.

(See transcript page 191) .

Gary Hinton, witness for the Division, also testified that the
Independents, in particular Navajo Communications, have a higher
percentage of subscribers who qualify for the Lifeline service,
leaving a lessor percentage of non-lifeline ratepayers to pay for
the program at substantially

higher rates.

Based upon that

testimony and other evidence presented to us in our rulemaking
hearing on this matter, we concluded that it would be unjust and
unreasonable to impose the Lifeline program on a company-specific
basis as Mountain Bell proposed, because the Independents would
be forced to so dramatically increase the rates charged to their
non-lifeline subscribers as to make the program unworkable.

We

concluded that there was no other alternative mechanism to fund
the Lifeline program than through the pooling of funds.
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing
therefore, the Commission will make the following:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Mountain
Bell's Petition for Review and Rehearing of the companion orders
to the Lifeline Rules is hereby denied.
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of February, 1987.
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B r i ^ n T. I S t e w a r t , iCjiairman

__
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B r e n t H. Cameron,

CL&rfes M. B y r n e ,

Attest;

Stephen C. Hewlett
Commission Secretary

Commissioner

Commissioner

EXHIBIT F

FEB 2 6

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In t h e Matter of t h e Petition of
MOUNTAIN BELL for a D e t e r mination of A p p r o p r i a t e Division
of C o s t s a n d R e v e n u e s b e t w e e n
Mountain Bell and Various
I n d e p e n d e n t Companies r e l a t i n g
to t h e Joint Provision of
IntraLATA Toll S e r v i c e s .

CASE NO. 85-049-06

PwEPORT ANT CR.DER
In t h e Matter of t h e Petition
of NAVAJO COMMUNICATIONS
COMPANY for t h e D e t e r m i n a tion of a J u s t and Reasonable
Division of Pvevenues Between
Navajo Communications C o m p a n y ,
I n c . and t h e Mountain S t a t e s
T e l e p h o n e and T e l e g r a p h
Company in Connection with
t h e Provision of t h e I n t r a LATA Toll S e r v i c e s in U t a h .

CASE NO. 35-050-01

ISSUED:

F e b r u a r y 25, 1936

By t h e Commission:
T h i s m a t t e r was i n i t i a t e d on J u n e 3 , 1935 b y t h e filing
Petition

by

Navajo

Communications

Company,

t h a t t h e Commission examine i s s u e s r e l a t i n g
Navajo

and

Ofountain

the

BelP .

Mountain

States

Telephone

Inc.

'Navajo^

Telegraph

testimony b y Mr. J a c k i e N. D u k e s .
Mr.

Eugene

between
Company

T h e m a t t e r ultimately was consolidated with Case No.

85-049-06 a n d came to h e a r i n g on S e p t e m b e r 1 1 , 1 Q 35.

by

requesting

to toll s e t t l e m e n t s
and

of a

A. E n e b o .

Briefs

Navaio p r e s e n t e d

Mountain Bell p r e s e n t e d
were subsequently

Mountain Bell and t h e Division of Public Utilities.

filed b y

testimony
Navajo,

CAST: NOS. 85-04Q-06 and 35-050-01
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both Navajo and Mountain Bell are certificated

telephone

public utilities in the state of Utah,
2.

Mavajo has three exchanges in Utah, all located in

the

southeastern part of the state,
3.

Prior to the divestiture of the Bell System on

T

anuary 1,

1934, intrastate long-distance calls between Mountain Bell exchanges and
Navaio exchanges were switched through Albuquerque, New Mexico; an
actual direct physical connection existed between Navajo and Mountain
Bell.
4.

At divestiture, the physical connection between Mountain

Bell and Navajo with regard to long-distance service within the state of
Utah ceased.
5.

Since divestiture, calls from a Navajo exchange in Utah to

a Mountain BeP exchange in Utah have been carried by AT&TM
sation for the joint provision of such calls
and Mountain Bell exchanges^

(

are currently

Compen-

i . e . those between Navajo
subject

to the

intrastate

access charge tariffs recently approved by this Commission in Case No.
83-999-11.
6.

The issue in this proceeding is whether Mountain Bell has

an obligation to continue toll settlements with regard to Navajo's

toll

traffic between its three exchanges in the state of Utah.
7.
and

switched

Toll traffic between those three exchanges is transported
exclusively by

Mavajo.

No Mountain

3ell

facilities

are

involved in any manner whatsoever.
8.

In

1^84,

Navaio requested

that

Judge

Greene

classify

CASE NOS. 85-049-06 and 85-050-01
- 3 Navajo's Utah and Arizona exchanges as non-associated territories within
each s t a t e .

This action was taken by Navajo in order to prevent

the

loss of $1.5 million in annual r e v e n u e s .
9.

On September 2, 1984, Judge Greene ruled that all Navajo

exchanges in Utah and Arizona "are to be considered separate independent non-associated territories within each state.''
10.

In December 1984, Mountain Bell informed Navajo that toll

settlements for Navajo's Utah intrastate traffic would chse in 1985.
11.

On March

26,

1985 Mountain

settlements would end on June

30,

1985.

3ell notified
Thereafter,

Navajo

that

Mountain

?jell

agreed to extend settlements until October 15, 1985.
12.

During the hearings in this matter, Mountain Bell agreed

to extend settlements to January 1, 1986.
CONCT.U5IQN5 OF LAuf
\.

In its

utes that it argues
order

Mountain

p

etition and Brief, Navajo cited several Utah statgives the Commission the jurisdictional power

Bell to

continue

toll

settlements

Commission has settlements with Navajo.

with

>V/ajc,

to

This

This Commission has tradition-

ally taken a broad view of its jurisdiction.

However, the Commission, as

a creature o* s t a t u t e , cannot fail to review and *ollow specific statutory
provisions relating to a specific set of facts.
?.

The statutory provisions cited by

v

avajo

(

e. g, Utah Code

Ann. ^ 5 4 - 3 - 7 , 54-3-3, 54-4-1, 54-4-2, 54-4-4, and 5 4 - 4 - ^

do indeed

grant this Commission broad powers to regulate the activities o* public
utilities operating in this state.

CASE NOS. 35-049-06 and S'-OSO-O1
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3.

However,

Navaio neither cited nor discussed

Utah

Code

Ann. §54-4-12, the specific section o* the Utah statutes that deals with
intrastate toll settlements.

Section 54-4-12 states:

Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing,
that a physical connection can reasonably be made between
the lines of two or more telephone corporations, or two or
more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made to
form a continuous line of communication by the construction and maintenance of suitable connections for the
transfer of messages or conversations, and that public
convenience and necessity will be subserved t h e r e b y , or
shall find that two or more telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to establish joint r a t e s , tolls or charges
for service by or over their said Unes and that joint
r a t e s , tolls or charges ought to be established, the commission mav, bv its o r d e r , require that such connection be
made, except where the purpose ot such connection is
primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or
conversations between points within the same city or town,
and that conversations be transmitted and messages t r a n s ferred over such connections u n d e r such rules and r e g u lations as the commission may establish and prescribe, and
that through lines and joint r a t e s , tolls and charges be
made and be u s e d , observed and be in force in the fut u r e . If such telephone or telegraph corporations do not
agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of
such physical connection or connections, or upon the
division oi the joint r a t e s , tolls or charges established by
the commission over such through lines, the Commission
shall have authority after a further hearing, tc establish
such division by supplemental o r d e r . (Emphasis added)
4.
a

statute

We are thus confronted with several general provisions and
relating

to

the

particular

sion—intrastate toll settlements.

issue

before

the

Commis-

The cases decided by the Utah

Su-

preme Court that deal with a conflict between a general statutory p r o vision and a specific provision make it clear "that express provisions of
statutes

take

precedence

over

general

ones.' 1

Pacific

Intermountain

Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 316 P . M 54Q 'Utah 1^57\
same principle has been recently reaffirmed
cisions,

Perrv v.

Pioneer Wholesale

SUDOIV

in at

]

east two other

The
de-

C o . , o3L P.?d 214 'Utah

CASE NQS. 35-049-06 and 35-050-01
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r
D

-

1984), Millett v. Clark Cline C o r p . , 609 P.2d 934 'Utah 1980).

In light

of these cases, the Commission must be guided by Section 54-4-12 to the
extent its terms conflict with other, more general, statutory provisions.
5«

Our review of Section 54-4-12 leads us to the conclusion

that the Commission cannot compel Mountain Bell to continue settlements
with Navajo with regard to ^avajo's intrastate toll traffic
three Utah exchanges.
several

times.

The

between its

Section 54-4-12 refers to "physical connection"
statute,

for

examule,

gives

the Commission

the

power to order a physical connection between two companies if necessary.

Obviously, no such physical connection is necessary in order for

Navajo to provide toll service between its Utah exchanges.

The statute

further states that if companies, which are physically connected, cannot
agree to the division "of the cost of such physical connections" or of the
division of revenues from such lines, then the Commission can establish
such division by o r d e r .
6.

In this

case,

the evidence is undisputed

physical connection exists and

(2)

that

(1^

all toll traffic between the

no

Navajo

exchanges is carried exclusively by Navajo.
7.
functional

It is also clear that

equivalent

of a separate

Navajo's

territory

LATA in

Utah.

in Utah is
Judge

the

Greene's

recent ruling made it clear that if areas are disassociated from a Bell
LATA, that a Bell Operating Company fsuch as Mountain Bell) "would be
forever b a r r e d from providing « ervice between the independent territory
and the adjacent LATA."

f o u n t a i n Bell Exhibit 5, at page 3 ) .

Thus,

Mountain Bell is legally precluded from establishing a physical connection
with Navajo in the state of Utah.

CASE NOS. 85-049-06 and 35-050-01
- 6 8.
cannot order

Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that it
Mountain Bell to continue settlements and that

Navajo's

Petition, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be g r a n ted.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Commission issues the following
ORDER
NOV/, THEREFORE, IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, That:
1*

The Petition of Navajo fails to state a claim for which this

Commission can grant relief and is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Mountain Bell has no obligation to continue settlements with

Navajo in the state of Utah beyond January 1, 1986,
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 25th cay of F e b r u a r y ,
1986.

I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
Is/

James M. 3 y r n e , Commissioner

Is! Brian
Attest:
I si Georgia 3 . Peterson, Secretary

m

Stewart , Commissioner

